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The term mutual trust has become a household term in the EU criminal justice 
vocabulary and is regarded to be a prerequisite for a successful application of the 
principle of mutual recognition. Regardless of its widespread use, it is often used in the 
vernacular, as if clear in itself. But as mutual trust has become one of the core 
objectives of the EU's criminal justice policy, and legislation is adopted to build trust, 
more specificity is required. This article attempts to unpick the notion of trust into its 
various elements. The argument is put forward that next to the principle's legal and 
political components, it also consists of more 'social' elements, as trust is a social 
construct after all. An assessment of the concept of trust developed in the social sciences 
reveals these additional elements and puts forward the idea of trust as a hybrid notion. 
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The topic of this article is the principle of mutual trust in EU criminal law. 
Development of that field of EU policy often labelled 'EU criminal law'1 took 
a flight in the late 90's when mutual recognition was introduced as the core 
governance principle in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), the 
EU's version of a judicial space launched with the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. In essence, mutual recognition requires Member 
States to give full recognition to judicial decisions taken in other jurisdictions 
across the EU.2 Mutual recognition in turn functions on a presumption of 
mutual trust; the logic is that the extraterritoriality of judicial decisions, 
created by mutual recognition, will only be accepted if there is a sufficiently 
                                                 
1 A note at the outset; the term 'EU criminal law' is imperfect and potentially 
misleading. We are not dealing with criminal law in the conventional sense in the 
EU; no norms that pose an immediate threat to individuals are created at EU level. 
Nevertheless, the term is widely accepted and used frequently to describe the body 
of law and policy under examination here. 
2 For more on mutual recognition see for example C. Janssens, The Principle of Mutual 
Recognition in EU Law (OUP 2013); W. van Ballegooij, The Nature of Mutual 
Recognition in European Law (Intersentia 2015). 
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high level of mutual trust between Member States. Mutual trust can 
therefore be regarded as the principle behind the principle. The relevance of 
mutual trust has only increased since the introduction of mutual recognition 
as the core governance principle in judicial cooperation in criminal justice 
matters, and particularly since the Treaty of Lisbon gave constitutional status 
to mutual recognition and expanded the law making powers of the EU in the 
field of criminal procedural law and coupled them directly with 'facilitating 
mutual recognition'.3 Mutual recognition was initially selected as a 
governance rule to further EU cooperation in criminal justice matters 
without having to harmonise national legal systems, which was both 
unfeasible and undesirable. Building mutual trust is regarded as the key to 
enhancing or facilitating mutual recognition (and the functioning of the AFSJ 
more widely), and has as such become a core aspect of the EU's criminal 
justice agenda.  
 
Since mutual recognition was put forward, a number of instruments have 
been adopted in its wake, the most important of which is the European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW), applying mutual recognition to extradition.4 
However, the first decade or so of mutual recognition has not been flawless, 
and the aim to circumvent harmonisation in the field of criminal law by 
pledging to recognise each other's judicial decisions has proven more difficult 
than initially thought. An important reason for the difficulties that mutual 
recognition is facing is attributed to a lack of mutual trust. In response, so 
called 'trust building measures' have been taken, both legal (most notably 
within the framework of the Roadmap on Criminal Procedural Rights),5 and 
non-legal. While engaging in trust building necessarily implies a lack of (or at 
least insufficient) trust, mutual recognition operates on a trust presumption, 
as repeatedly confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU).6 Regardless of this inconsistency (or contradiction), over time the 
                                                 
3 See art 82(2) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
4 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002, OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 
1–20 [hereafter EAW]; on the EAW see for example L. Klimek, The European Arrest 
Warrant (Springer 2014); J. Spencer, 'The European Arrest Warrant' (2003) 7 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 201. 
5 For more on the Roadmap see section II.3. 
6 For more on the CJEU see section II.4. 
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term mutual trust has become strongly embedded in the EU criminal law 
vocabulary and the idea that mutual trust is a prerequisite to a successful 
application of mutual recognition is widely accepted. But despite its 
widespread use and acceptance as a central policy aim, the concept of trust 
remains broad and ambiguous, and the EU has not made much effort to give 
insight into its exact meaning or functioning. Moreover, academic literature 
on the topic initially mainly challenged the trust presumption on grounds of 
insufficient regard to fundamental rights throughout the EU, while broader 
development of the notion of trust itself took off more slowly.  
 
Currently, mutual trust is deployed to serve a broad spectrum of purposes, 
the most important of which is linked to eliminating differences between 
national criminal justice systems in the name of trust building (the logic being 
that if all national systems were perfectly equal trust would not be an issue). 
This creates an interesting paradox. Mutual recognition as a mode of 
governance was chosen exactly to enable cooperation while preserving 
national differences, and mutual trust serves as a prerequisite to that end.  
But if the principle of mutual trust ultimately leads to convergence (i.e. by 
eliminating those differences), it in effect reintroduces harmonisation 
(through the back door) and might actually run counter to the very core idea 
of mutual recognition. A legitimate question then would be whether mutual 
trust supports or contravenes mutual recognition. In order to answer this 
pressing question, a first important step is to clarify the role and function of 
mutual trust. 
 
This article will address that lack of clarity and put forward the argument that 
mutual trust is a term of art in the EU criminal law context, with a meaning 
specific to the particularities of EU criminal justice cooperation. Yet, it is not 
completely separate from what can be regarded trust as a social construct. It 
is for this reason that, in addition to (the more conventional) legal/political 
analysis, a social science perspective is employed. When the two perspectives 
are combined, a hybrid principle emerges. The purpose of conceptualisation 
of the principle of mutual trust is twofold. First, it should enable a more 
informed debate on the functioning of the AFSJ (the criminal law component 
more in particular). Second, it should allow for scrutinising the legislative 
programme that is carried out to enhance or build trust.   
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The article is structured as follows. Section 2 will give insight into the EU's 
ambiguous trust discourse, followed by an overview of the (critical) reception 
of mutual trust in EU criminal law literature in section 3. Subsequently, 
section 4 will present a number of core aspects of trust as developed in the 
social sciences in order to enlighten the debate on the issue of trust. Section 
5 will then identify the characteristics that are particular to trust in the EU 
criminal justice environment. The last section 6 will combine these two 
groups of elements and draw general conclusions. 
 
II. THE EU'S TRUST DISCOURSE 
 
1. Establishing the Trust Presumption 
The term 'mutual trust' is widely used by the various EU institutions in the 
criminal justice discourse, e.g. in policy documents, legislation and case law. 
Nevertheless, there is no document setting out a shared understanding of its 
scope and fundamentals. The term was given prominence from the very 
beginning of mutual recognition in the AFSJ and serves as its foundation. The 
mutual recognition-mutual trust nexus is not sufficiently substantiated 
though; that mutual recognition is not flourishing is sufficiently 
documented,7 but that this is because of a lack of trust has not been 
convincingly shown.  
 
Since its introduction, mutual trust has been both presumed to exist and to 
lack, hence; 'mutual recognition … has many faces – as many as mutual trust 
in the EU's and the Member States' discourse(s)'.8 This section will give an 
                                                 
7 Particularly in light of the EAW, see for example S. Carrera, E. Guild and N. Hernanz, 
'Europe's Most Wanted? Recalibrating Trust in the European Arrest Warrant 
System' (2013) 55 CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe 
<https://www.ceps.eu/publications/europe%E2%80%99s-most-wanted-recalibrati 
ng-trust-european-arrest-warrant-system>; L. Marin, 'Effective and Legitimate? 
Learning from the Lessons of 10 Years of Practice with the European Arrest 
Warrant' (2013) 5(3) New Journal of European Criminal Law 327; A. Weyembergh, 
'European Added Value Assessment: the EU Arrest Warrant' (2014) Research 
Paper- European Added Value United http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegDat 
a/etudes/etudes/join/2013/510979/IPOL-JOIN_ET(2013)510979(ANN01)_EN.pdf.  
8 G. Vermeulen, 'Flaws and Contradictions in the Mutual Trust and Recognition 
Discourse: Casting a Shadow on the Legitimacy of EU Criminal Policy Making and 
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insight into the EU's inconsistent and at times contradictory mutual 
recognition/mutual trust narrative. 
 
Upon inception of mutual recognition at the Tampere European Council 
(1999),9 it was not explicitly linked with a requirement of mutual trust.10 It 
was not long though until mutual trust came into the picture. Less than a year 
later the Commission held, when presenting its view on mutual recognition, 
that '[m]utual trust is an important element, not only trust in the adequacy of 
one's partners rules, but also trust that these rules are correctly applied'.11 
Again less than a year later in 2001, the Programme to implement mutual 
recognition was released and made an important contribution to the trust 
discourse by introducing the presumption of trust;  
 
Implementation of the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in 
criminal matters presupposes that Member States have trust in each other's' 
criminal justice systems. That trust is grounded, in particular, on their shared 
commitment to the principles of freedom, democracy and respect for human 
rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.12 
 
The articulation of a direct link between mutual recognition and mutual trust 
has been of paramount importance for the policy to facilitate mutual 
recognition, or even broader the EU's criminal justice policy as a whole, and 
still resonates today. By grounding this presumption on the shared 
                                                 
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters?' in N. Persak (ed), Legitimacy and Trust in 
Criminal Law, Policy and Justice (Ashgate Publishing 2014) 153, 154. 
9 For a closer look at the process that led to the adoption of mutual recognition see H. 
Nilsson, 'Mutual Trust or Mutual Mistrust?' in G. de Kerchove and A. Weyembergh 
(eds), La Confiance Mutuelle Dans l'Espace Pénal Européen/Mutual Trust in the European 
Criminal Area (Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles 2005) 29. 
10 At Tampere, mutual recognition was introduced as the 'cornerstone principle' in EU 
criminal justice cooperation. See Tampere European Council (15-16 October 1999), 
Presidency Conclusions, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm>. 
11 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
'Mutual recognition of Final Decisions in criminal matters' COM (2000) 495 final, 
4. 
12 'Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of 
decisions in criminal matters', OJ C12/10, 15 January 2001, 10 [hereafter the 
Programme]. 
217 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol 9 No.1 
commitment 'to the principles of freedom, democracy and respect for human 
rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law' a justification was given, be 
it in a rather formalistic manner. 
 
It appears that the trust presumption was regarded to be solid, as at the time 
no measures to strengthen mutual trust were prioritised. The Programme did 
set out to 'enhance the protection of individual rights', but as a self-standing 
goal of the mutual recognition project, not with an instrumental, mutual 
recognition enhancing, purpose. 
 
The EAW, the first mutual recognition measure, closely followed the 
Programme's rationale and 'is based on a high level of confidence between 
Member States'.13 The instrument attempts to establish from the outset that 
confidence (or trust) is at its core.14 But as the instrument contains various 
indications to the contrary (grounds for refusal, partial abolition of double 
criminality etc.),15 this preambular statement can be regarded more as 
(political) rhetoric than (legal) reality.16 
 
2. First Questions on the Validity of the Trust Presumption 
Shortly after the introduction of the 'presumption of trust' it was already 
questioned and the need to enhance trust was articulated by the Commission. 
In its 2003 Green Paper on procedural rights, the need to strengthen trust 
was made explicit and directly linked to the absence of a uniform standard of 
                                                 
13 EAW, recital 10. 
14 Note the use of the term 'confidence' in the EAW, used interchangeably with 'trust' 
in the subsequent discourse. It is not clear whether a different concept is denoted, 
but according to Walker the two differ; 'confidence is an accomplished state upon 
which we can more or less passively rely; trust is an active way of building confidence 
or otherwise dealing with the absence of confident expectations', see N. Walker, 
'The Problem of Trust in an Enlarged Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A 
Conceptual Analysis', in J. Apap and M. Anderson (eds), Police and Justice Cooperation 
and the New European Borders (Kluwer 2002) 19, 22. 
15 See section III. 1 below. 
16 According to Eijsbouts and Reestman, 'In actual fact it [the EAW] seems to breathe 
mistrust of states having a liberal criminal law tradition', see W. Eijsbouts and J. 
Reestman, 'Editorial - Mutual Trust' (2006) 2(1) European Constitutional Law 
Review 1, 1. 
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defence rights.17 Underlying such calls was the contention that an EU wide 
measure offering suspects and defendants a minimum standard of procedural 
fairness would accommodate the lack of trust. Note that the issue was raised 
prior to the entry into force of the EAW, which is often regarded as the main 
source of dissatisfaction with the safeguarding of individual rights. But 
Member States could at the time (the negotiations lasted from 2004 until 
2007) not agree on such an instrument,18 it however seemed obvious that 
sooner or later the issue of procedural safeguards would return. The second 
multi-annual programme in the area of justice and home affairs, the Hague 
Programme, further underlined the mutual recognition-mutual trust nexus,19 
and the subsequent Stockholm Programme elevated the importance of 
mutual trust and declared 'ensuring trust' to be 'one of the main challenges 
for the future'.20 It also repeated the logic that rights of the individual in 
criminal proceedings are regarded as 'essential in order to maintain mutual 
trust between the Member States and public confidence in the European 
Union'.21 
 
In the meantime, the adoption of cooperation measures based on mutual 
recognition continued, but were signified by a change of tone. The 2008 
Framework Decision on custodial sentences, declared rather modestly that 
mutual recognition 'should become the cornerstone' and that relations 
                                                 
17 Green Paper from the Commission 'Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and 
Defendants in Criminal Proceedings throughout the European Union', COM (2003) 
75 final. 
18 On these negotiations see M. Jimeno-Bulnes, 'The Proposal for a Council 
Framework Decision on Certain Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings 
Throughout the European Union' in E. Guild and F. Geyer (eds), Security versus 
Justice? Police and Judicial Cooperation in the European Union (Ashgate 2008) 171. 
19 'The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the 
European Union' (2005) OJ C53/01; see also the action plan implementing The 
Hague Programme, (2005) OJ C198/01. Section 3.2 of the Programme is devoted to 
'confidence-building and mutual trust'. 
20 'The Stockholm Programme — An open and secure Europe serving and protecting 
citizens' (2010) OJ C115/1; see also the 'Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm 
Programme', COM (2010) 171 final. 
21 ibid, 2.4. 
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between Member States 'are characterised by special mutual confidence'.22 
Not even ten years after the inception of mutual recognition and its euphoric 
introduction, a different, almost timid tone was chosen. This shift was rather 
sudden, considering that the Commission had noted in 2005 that mutual 
recognition still 'is' the cornerstone of judicial cooperation.23 Even more 
illustrative in this light is the 2014 European Investigation Order (EIO), 
which explicitly acknowledges that the trust presumption is rebuttable and 
introduces a human rights refusal ground.24 The increase in scepticism 
toward the presumption of trust (call it realism) expressed by the EU 
legislator in recent mutual recognition measures, is possibly the result of the 
first decade of experience with the EAW and the insights this gave into the 
difficulties mutual recognition presented in practice. 
 
3. First Tangible Step in Trust Building: The Roadmap 
After years of fruitless debate on an EU procedural rights measure, in 2009 
progress was finally made by adopting the Roadmap on Criminal Procedural 
Rights.25 The first 'visible' legislative step was taken to build trust by 
approximating procedural law,26 and as such presents the most prominent 
expression of the legal relevance of the principle of mutual trust. 
The central aim of the Roadmap is to strengthen the procedural rights of 
suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings by employing a 'step-
                                                 
22 Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008, OJ L 327/27, 
recitals 1 and 5. 
23 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
of 10 May 2005- The Hague Programme: ten priorities for the next five years, COM 
(2005), 184 final, OJ C 236. 
24 Directive 2014/41/EU of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in 
criminal matters, OJ L 130/1, recital 19 and art 11.  
25 'Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening 
procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings', (2009) 
OJ C295/1 [hereafter Roadmap]; for more on the Roadmap see e.g. J. Blackstock, 
'Procedural Safeguards in the European Union: A Road Well Travelled?' (2012) 2(1) 
European Criminal Law Review 20. 
26 In addition to procedural approximation, trust building capacities have also been 
attributed to substantive approximation, see e.g. A. Weyembergh, 'Approximation 
of Criminal Laws, the Constitutional Treaty and the Hague Programme' (2005) 42(6) 
Common Market Law Review 1567, 1575. 
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by-step' approach. The starting point was to adopt five measures on basic 
procedural rights and the Commission was invited to propose EU legislation 
to this end.27 However, improving the position of the individual in criminal 
proceedings throughout the EU is not an end in itself, but rather a means to 
an(other) end; namely to facilitate mutual recognition, in line with the legal 
basis employed (Article 82(2) TFEU). Trust serves as the conceptual link 
between means and ends; hence the full chain, and thus the Roadmap's 
rationale, is as follows:  
 
Legal measure Conceptual aim End goal 
EU wide procedural rights→ enhance trust(worthiness) → facilitate mutual recognition 
Figure 1: Trust as conceptual link between means and ends 
 
Recital 8 gives insight into the Roadmap's rationale regarding trust: 
 
Mutual recognition presupposes that the competent authorities of the 
Member States trust the criminal justice systems of the other Member 
States. For the purpose of enhancing mutual trust within the European 
Union, it is important that, complementary to the Convention [ECHR], 
there exist European Union standards for the protection of procedural rights 
which are properly implemented and applied in the Member States.28 
 
The Roadmap thus builds on the trust presumption's formal foundation, 
namely the existence of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), by introducing EU standards in addition to already existing 
standards. Furthermore, the exact trust relation aimed at by the Roadmap is 
that competent authorities should have trust in foreign criminal justice systems. 
Confirming the instrumental function, not in the first place to improve the 
position of the individual in order to increase citizens' trust in the EU, as 
                                                 
27 The first five measures have been adopted on interpretation and translation (OJ 
L280/1, 2010), the right to information (L 142/1, 2012), the right to access to a lawyer 
(OJ L294/1, 2013), the presumption of innocence and the right to be present at trial 
(OJ L65/1, 2016), and on special safeguards for children (OJ L132/1, 2016). One more 
has been proposed on the right to legal aid. 
28 Roadmap, recital 8. 
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alleged by the multi-annual programmes, but to enhance cooperation and 
therefore geared towards judicial authorities. Nevertheless, sound evidence 
of the ratio of how exactly procedural rights will enhance judicial cooperation 
(and thus trust) is lacking, as well as why these exact rights are selected by the 
Roadmap. Is this simply the result of political realities (these are the rights 
that Member States could agree on), or is there empirical evidence that 
exactly this approach will facilitate mutual recognition, e.g. because national 
differences in the distribution of these specific rights hamper a successful 
application of mutual recognition? Unfortunately, the Roadmap itself does 
not provide clear answers to these questions. This raises issues of subsidiarity 
(Article 5(3) TEU) and whether the activation of the legal basis of Article 82(2) 
TFEU is justified (i.e. are there 'objective factors which are amenable to 
judicial review').29 As the first two measures have just entered into force, it is 
too soon to tell how these will play out in practice,30 especially since these are 
supposed to function as a whole and can as such be fully tested when all 
measures have been adopted and are in function.31 But in order to scrutinise 
whether the programme to introduce EU-wide procedural rights meets the 
legislative purpose of 'facilitating mutual recognition', through 'enhancing 
mutual trust', it is important to understand what trust is. 
 
4. The CJEU: A Mutual Trust Stronghold? 
Regardless of its limited jurisdiction pre-Lisbon and the five-year transitional 
period under Lisbon, the CJEU has found ample opportunity to weigh in on 
                                                 
29 See also J. Oberg, 'Subsidiarity and EU Procedural Criminal Law' (2015) 5(1) 
European Criminal Law Review 19; P. Asp et al. 'European Criminal Policy Initiative 
- A Manifesto on European Criminal Procedure Law' (2013) 11 Zeitschrift für 
Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 430, 432-433; W. de Bondt and G. Vermeulen, 
'The Procedural Rights Debate: A Bridge Too Far or Still Not Far Enough?' (2010) 4 
EUcrim 163, 164. 
30 For an evaluation see D. Sayers, 'Protecting Fair Trial Rights in Criminal Cases in 
the European Union: Where does the Roadmap take Us?' (2014) 14(4) Human Rights 
Law Review 733; E. Cape, 'Transposing the EU Directive on the Right to 
Information: A Firecracker or a Damp Squib?' (2015) 1 Criminal Law Review 48. 
31 See T. Spronken, 'EU Policy to Guarantee Procedural Rights in Criminal 
Proceedings: an Analysis of the First Steps and a Plea for a Holistic Approach' (2011) 
1(3) European Criminal Law Review 213. 
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the development of mutual trust.32 More than any other EU institution, the 
Court has upheld the presumption of trust and became one of its strongest 
defenders.33 But despite mutual trust being a central theme in the Court's 
AFSJ jurisprudence, it has not qualified or clarified the notion of trust, but 
merely adhered to the presumption found on shared respect for human 
rights.  
 
The notion of mutual trust is inextricably linked with the principle of mutual 
recognition, but the Court's first view of mutual trust came in a different 
context. In Gözütok and Brügge,34 the Court was asked whether ne bis in idem 
prohibited criminal proceedings in a Member State where prosecution was 
sought on the same facts that in another jurisdiction had been definitively 
discontinued.35 In a landmark decision the Court ruled in the affirmative.36 
The Court held that the main justification for such an EU-wide application 
of ne bis in idem is mutual trust; 
 
there is a necessary implication that the Member States have mutual trust in 
their criminal justice systems and that each of them recognises the criminal 
law in force in the other Member States even when the outcome would be 
different if its own national law were applied.37 
 
                                                 
32 For a more in-depth analysis of the Court's case law on the subject see e.g. V. 
Mitsilegas, 'The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe's Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice: From Automatic Inter-State Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the 
Individual' (2012) 31(1) Yearbook of European Law 319, 336-349. 
33 See also T. Ostropolski, 'The CJEU as a Defender of Mutual Trust' (2015) 6(2) New 
Journal of European Criminal Law 166. 
34 Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:87, Gözütok and Brügge. 
35 Ne bis in idem, or the principle of double jeopardy, confers to individuals the right not 
to be prosecuted or tried twice for the same criminal conduct. Traditionally, the 
principle functioned only within a single jurisdiction. See e.g. A. Weyembergh and I. 
Armada, 'The Principle of ne bis in idem in Europe's Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice' in V. Mitsilegas et al. (eds), Research Handbook on EU Criminal Law (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2016) 189. 
36 See also M. Fletcher, 'Some Developments to the ne bis in idem Principle in the 
European Union: Criminal Proceedings Against Huseyn Gozutok and Klaus Brugge' 
(2003) 66(5) Modern Law Review 769. 
37 Gözütok and Brügge, para 33. 
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Shortly after Gözütok and Brügge the trust presumption was transferred to 
different situations. The first preliminary questions on the EAW were raised 
in Advocaten voor de Wereld,38 where the Court was, inter alia, asked to rule on 
the validity of the instrument.39 The Court upheld the measure and held that 
the instrument was justified 'on the basis of the principle of mutual 
recognition and in the light of the high degree of trust and solidarity between 
the Member States'.40 
 
However, it turned out that the reach of the trust presumption is not infinite 
and the Court ruled in N.S.,41 an asylum case (a separate AFSJ policy field, also 
governed by mutual recognition), that the presumption can be rebutted.42 By 
opening up the presumption of fundamental rights compliance to rebuttal, 
the Court radically altered interstate cooperation in the AFSJ. According to 
Mitsilegas, this seminal ruling 'constitutes a turning point in the evolution of 
inter-state cooperation in the [AFSJ]', and 'signifies the end of automaticity 
in inter-state cooperation not only as regards the Dublin Regulation, but also 
as regards cooperative systems in the fields of criminal law and civil law.'43 
Peers opined that 'logically, the judgment should apply by analogy to other 
areas of Justice and Home Affairs law'.44 
 
                                                 
38 Case C-303/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:261, Advocaten voor de Wereld. 
39 See also F. Geyer, 'Case Note: Advocaten voor de Wereld' (2008) 4 European 
Constitutional Law Review 149. 
40 Advocaten voor de Wereld, para 57. 
41 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865, N.S. and others, 21 
December 2011, at 86; see also M. den Heijer, 'Case Note' (2012) 49(5) Common 
Market Law Review 1735. 
42 The Court held that Article 4 of the EU Charter (prohibition of torture and inhuman 
or degrading treatment) precludes the transfer of an asylum seeker from one 
Member State to another in accordance with the Dublin Regulation if there are 
systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and reception conditions in the 
receiving Member State that give rise to a real risk of violation. 
43 Mitsilegas (fn 32), 358. 
44 S. Peers, 'Court of Justice: The NS and ME Opinions - The Death of "Mutual 
Trust"?' Statewatch Analysis <http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-148-dublin-
mutual-trust.pdf>. 
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National courts indeed asked the Court of Justice whether an EAW must be 
executed when human rights may have been breached,45 first in Radu.46 But 
because Radu centred his complaint on the refusal of the German authorities 
to hear him prior to issuing the warrant, a right not given by the EAW nor the 
EU Charter, the Court rejected the argument and avoided a ruling on the 
(wider) contentious issue of refusal to execute a warrant when human rights 
violations occur in the issuing state.47 The issue (re-)appeared in various 
subsequent cases, but the Court held on to a close reading of the trust 
presumption and the exhaustive system of refusal grounds as set out by the 
EAW.48 For a while, the Court managed to carefully manoeuvre around the 
issue, a stance which has been heavily criticised as it values efficient judicial 
cooperation on the basis of mutual trust over fundamental rights.49  
 
It always seemed likely that sooner or later the question would reappear and 
needed to be faced head on. And indeed, it did. In Aranyosi the question was 
raised whether refusal of a EAW was allowed in case of surrender to a 
Member State whose prison conditions are below standard.50 Under such 
                                                 
45 The EAW itself contains very little on procedural guarantees. There has been debate 
about the legal value of the preamble's phrase that the 'Framework Decision respects 
fundamental rights' (Recital 12), and Article 1(3) reiterates Member States' obligation 
to respect fundamental rights. But a general fundamental rights clause that allows 
states to refuse surrender in cases in which such rights would be endangered is 
absent. 
46 Case C-396/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:39, Radu. 
47 Advocate General Sharpston in her opinion however came to a different conclusion 
and defended a general human rights refusal ground. See Opinion of Advocate 
General Sharpston in Case C-396/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:648, Radu. On the topic see 
also M. Bose, 'Human Rights Violations and Mutual Trust: Recent Case Law on the 
European Arrest Warrant' in S. Ruggeri (ed), Human Rights in European Criminal Law 
(Springer 2015) 135. 
48 See Case C-399/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, Stefano Melloni; and Case C-237/15 PPU, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:474, Minister for Justice and Equality v Francis Lanigan. 
49 See for example M. Ventrella, 'European Integration or Democracy Disintegration 
in Measures Concerning Police and Judicial Cooperation?' (2013) 4(3) New Journal 
of European Criminal Law 290. 
50 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2016:198, Aranyosi and 
Căldăraru; see S. Gáspár-Szilágyi, 'Joined Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru: Converging 
Human Rights Standards, Mutual Trust and a New Ground for Postponing a 
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conditions, i.e. if there is a real and substantial risk of inhuman or degrading 
treatment because of detention conditions in the issuing state, the Court 
allows postponement of a EAW. But before such a call can be made, the 
executing authority will have to request all information necessary on the 
detention, while deferring execution of the warrant; a final attempt to 
prevent a conflict by way of direct consultations between cooperating 
authorities.  
 
Despite the high threshold set by the Court ('real and substantial risk') and 
the obligation to exhaust all means of communication before a request can be 
postponed, Aranyosi presents a significant departure from earlier cases in 
which it heavily relied on the closed system of refusal grounds and the strong 
presumption of mutual trust. For now, it remains to be seen what other 
human rights defects will justify postponement, and what exactly 
'postponement' entails, but most important is that the Court has opened up 
the opportunity to rebut the trust presumption in the context of the EAW. 
The Court has in Aranyosi for the first time ruled that, like in mutual 
recognition's other incarnations, such as in the internal market and civil law 
cooperation,51 there are limits to its application. 
 
Nevertheless, the importance the Court attributes to the principle of mutual 
trust in the EU legal order should not be underestimated, as can be illustrated 
by Opinion 2/13,52 on the EU's accession to the ECHR.53 In Opinion 2/13, the 
Court declared the draft Agreement for Accession to be incompatible with 
                                                 
European Arrest Warrant' (2016) 24(2/3) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law 
and Criminal Justice 197. 
51 See G. Tosato, 'Some Remarks on the Limits to the Mutual Recognition of Judicial 
Decisions in Civil and Criminal Matters within the European Union', (2002) 38(3-4) 
Rivista di Diritto Internazionale Privato e Processuale 869. 
52 Opinion 2/13, 18 December 2014. 
53 On the EU's accession to the ECHR see P. Gragl, The Accession of the European Union 
to the European Convention on Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2013). 
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primary EU law.54 The Court, inter alia,55 expresses concerns that accession 
could undermine mutual trust, and reiterates that it considers mutual trust to 
be an essential component in order to create 'an ever closer Union'.56 The 
Court furthermore underlines that 'the principle of mutual trust … is of 
fundamental importance in EU law',57 and allows no space for evaluation of 
other Member State's human rights records, as EU law requires this 
presumption to be firm.58 The threat that the ECHR would require Member 
States to assess each other's human rights compliance would undermine that 
presumption. A reasoning which does not display great believe in the genuine 
existence of trust. This view is taken even further when the Court turns the 
trust 'presumption' into an 'obligation'.59 An interpretation that seems far 
removed from what even an everyday notion of trust entails; few would 
contest that if one would be 'obliged' to trust (under penalty of law) this can 
no longer be considered genuine trust. Furthermore, it alters the perception 
of the AFSJ as a legal space found on the protection of fundamental rights.60 
                                                 
54 The Court found a number of obstacles in the Opinion, which is binding, and has 
made accession very difficult. See e.g. B. de Witte and S. Imamovic, 'Opinion 2/13 on 
Accession to the ECHR: Defending the EU Legal Order Against a Foreign Human 
Rights Court' (2015) 40(5) European Law Review 683. The Opinion has been heavily 
criticised for seeking to protect basic elements of the EU legal order 'by disregarding 
the fundamental values upon which the Union was founded', see S. Peers, 'The EU's 
Accession to the ECHR: The Dream Becomes a Nightmare' (2015) 16(1) German 
Law Journal 213, 213. 
55 The concern that mutual trust would be undermined is part of a wider argument that 
accession would be a threat for the autonomy of EU law and its sui generis nature. See 
also S. Douglas-Scott, 'Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR: A Christmas 




56 Opinion 2/13, para 167. 
57 ibid, para 191. 
58 ibid, para 192. 
59 ibid, 'EU law imposes an obligation of mutual trust between those Member States'. 
60 See also V. Mitsilegas, 'Judicial Concepts of Trust in Europe's Multi-Level Security 
Governance' (2015) 3 EUcrim 90, 92, 'It thus represents a significant challenge to our 
understanding of the EU constitutional order as a legal order underpinned by the 
protection of fundamental rights.' 
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Instead, the Court presents a view of a system in which fundamental rights 
protection comes only second after adherence to the notion of mutual trust, 
rather than the other way around.  
 
5. A Rather Ambiguous Discourse 
On first reading, the trust ratio is as simple as the mutual recognition 
principle itself. Mutual trust is a prerequisite to mutual recognition and is 
grounded on the presumption that states adhere to the same standards of 
justice and fairness (mainly in the form of the ECHR). So far so good. 
However, an assessment of the dynamics of the trust narrative as developed 
by the various EU actors since the introduction of mutual recognition shows 
a more troublesome image. The principle of mutual trust has been used in a 
rather ambiguous and incoherent fashion, and has fluctuated over time and 
with different actors within the EU, going from a presumption to a rebuttal. 
This incoherency erodes on the credibility of the discourse.61  
A distinction can be noticed between the legislative and the executive 
branches on the one hand, and the judiciary on the other. Whereas the 
former (mainly the Council and the Commission, but also the European 
Parliament by pushing for comprehensive procedural rights measures) 
relatively soon after Tampere reversed the trust presumption into a lack of 
trust presumption and called for additional trust building measures, the 
CJEU has long remained a stronghold of the trust presumption and regards 
mutual trust a principle of fundamental importance in EU law.  
Observing the EU's trust narrative an evolution can be noticed though; from 
a high level of confidence and a strict trust presumption to a rebuttal and 
more leeway for Member States to derogate from mutual recognition. On the 
legislative side this evolution can be illustrated by the development from the 
EAW to the EIO, and on the side of the CJEU from Gözütok and Brügge and 
Radu to Aranyosi. But besides discussions on whether trust exists, the actual 
meaning of the concept remains elusive. Illustrative for the ambiguous and 
loose nature of the discourse is the interchangeable use of terms as trust and 
                                                 
61 See also Vermeulen (fn 8), 'the credibility of the EU's discourse on the matter (and 
therefore its moral authority, which is grounded on it) will undeniably be 
significantly compromised when it is marked by manifest contradictions or 
illogicality, flagrant ambiguousness or plain conceptual incoherence', 153. 
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confidence,62 the many different relations in which trust is supposed to play 
a role (horizontal, vertical) and generic phrases as 'a climate' and 'a spirit' of 
trust. The lack of conceptual clarity has not been raised by EU actors as being 
problematic and the contradictory terms trust presumption and trust 
building have over the years become strongly embedded in the EU criminal 
justice vocabulary, leading to a mutual trust dichotomy.  
 
III. THE RECEPTION OF MUTUAL TRUST IN ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
 
1. Challenging the Trust Presumption 
Mutual trust as a principle of EU criminal law has been embraced not only at 
EU level, but also in the ensuing literature. The idea that mutual trust is a 
prerequisite for a successful functioning of mutual recognition in criminal 
justice matters has largely been accepted.63 At the same time, the 
presumption of mutual trust has been criticised for lacking foundation.64 For 
example, Konstadinides 'argues that ''mutual recognition'' does not 
necessarily imply mutual trust'.65 While it was initially 'hoped' that the 
                                                 
62 Walker (fn 14).  
63 See for example O. de Schutter, 'The Two Europes of Human Rights: The Emerging 
Division of Tasks between the Council of Europe and the European Union in 
Promoting Human Rights in Europe' (2008) 14(3) Columbia Journal of European 
Law 509, 542; H. Nilsson, 'Mutual Trust and Mutual Recognition of our Differences. 
A Personal View' in G. de Kerchove and A. Weyembergh (eds), La Reconnaissance 
Mutuelle des Décisions Judiciaires Pénales dans l'Union Européenne (Editions de 
l'Université de Bruxelles 2001) 155, 158. 
64 See e.g. Carrera et al. (fn 7), 'It is argued that the next generation of the EU's criminal 
justice cooperation and the EAW need to recognise and acknowledge that the 
mutual trust premise upon which the European system has been built so far is no 
longer viable without devising new EU policy stakeholders' structures and evaluation 
mechanisms. These should allow for the recalibration of mutual trust and mistrust in 
EU justice systems in light of the experiences of the criminal justice actors and 
practitioners having a stake in putting the EAW into daily effect'. 
65 T. Konstadinides, 'The Europeanisation of Extradition: How Many Light Years 
Away to Mutual Confidence?' in C. Eckes and T. Konstadinides (eds), Crime Within 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A European Public Order (CUP 2011) 192, 194; 
see also M. Möstl, 'Preconditions and Limits of Mutual Recognition' (2010) 47(2) 
Common Market Law Review 405, 419; and P. Asp, 'Basic Models of a European 
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'Member States of the European Union now have reached the level of faith 
and trust to enable them to accept all of its consequences',66 it was not long 
until it turned out that reality was more nuanced. Or, in the words of 
Vernimmen and Surano; 'mutual trust was simply assumed to exist … in 
reality, this trust is still not spontaneously felt and is by no means always 
evident in practice'.67 
 
The trust presumption rests on an equivalence presumption, and in the 
criminal law sphere this equivalence relates to the quality of judicial decisions 
and procedural safeguards. Because of large differences between national 
criminal law systems, in particular in procedural systems of protection,68 and 
little regard to individual rights in mutual recognition instruments (mainly 
the EAW), this ground turned out to be rather shaky. Alegre and Leaf were 
early to recognise these impending problems, and prior to EU wide 
application of the EAW warned that serious human rights concerns would 
arise in applying mutual recognition to the field of criminal justice 
cooperation.69 The issue of fundamental rights is regarded as fundamental to 
the viability of mutual recognition; the idea is that if the safeguarding of 
defence rights throughout the EU is insufficient, the trust basis is absent and 
so is the fundament of the mutual recognition project. 
 
                                                 
Penal Law: Mutual Recognition, Cooperation, Harmonisation' (2008) 4 
Europäischer Juristentag 259, 264. 
66 Nilsson (fn 63), 158. 
67 G. Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen and L. Surano, 'Analysis of the future of mutual 
recognition in criminal matters in the European Union' (2008) Institute for 
European Studies, Université Libre de Bruxelles 20, <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/ 
criminal/files/mutual_recognition_en.pdf>. 
68 See for example, S. Summers, Fair Trials: The European Criminal Procedural Tradition 
and the European Court of Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2007), 3; E. Cape, Z. 
Namoradze, R. Smith and T. Spronken (eds), Effective Criminal Defence in Europe 
(Intersentia 2010); and J. Hodgson, 'EU Criminal Justice: The Challenge of Due 
Process Rights Within a Framework of Mutual Recognition' (2011) 37(2) North 
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 307. 
69 S. Alegre and M. Leaf, 'Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation: A 
Step Too Far Too Soon? Case Study—the European Arrest Warrant' (2004) 10(2) 
European Law Journal 200. 
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There are various fundamental rights related issues that have led to the 
conclusion that the trust basis is indeed lacking. An example is the 
proportionality problem,70 i.e. the systematic issuing of high numbers of 
EAW's for petty crimes by some Member States.71 Another 'trust' related 
issue has been in relation to in absentia judgments, which has led to 
amendment of the EAW in 2009.72 Other examples that can be mentioned 
are (poor) prison conditions and the (excessive) length of pre-trial detention.  
Furthermore, a number of non (or non-directly) fundamental rights related 
'signals' of distrust have appeared in literature. Prominent 'expressions of 
distrust' include;73 the (poor) implementation of the EAW,74 the 
constitutional challenges in various Member States to the validity of the 
EAW,75 and the EAW's (partial) abolition of double criminality.76 
  
                                                 
70 In its 2011 report the Commission observed that confidence in the application of the 
EAW had been undermined by the systematic issue of EAWs for the surrender of 
persons sought in respect of very minor offences, see COM (2011) 175 final; Carrera 
et al (fn 7), argue that the proportionality issue presents one of the major challenges 
to mutual trust, 19-21. 
71 For more on proportionality see E. Xanthopoulou, 'The Quest for Proportionality 
for the European Arrest Warrant: Fundamental Rights Protection in a Mutual 
Recognition Environment' (2015) 6(1) New Journal of European Criminal Law 32. 
72 See Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, OJ L81/24; 
see also M. Bose, 'Harmonizing Procedural Rights Indirectly: The Framework 
Decision on Trials in Absentia' (2011) 37(2) North Carolina Journal of International 
Law and Commercial Regulation 489. 
73 E. van Sliedrecht, 'The European Arrest Warrant: Between Trust, Democracy and 
the Rule of Law' (2007) 3(2) European Constitutional Law Review 244, 245. 
74 See M. Fichera, The Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in the European 
Union: Law, Policy and Practice (Intersentia 2011). 
75 See E. Guild (ed), Constitutional Challenges to the European Arrest Warrant (Wolf Legal 
Publishers 2006); E. Guild and L. Marin (eds), Still Not Resolved: Constitutional Issues 
of the European Arrest Warrant (Wolf Legal Publishers 2009). 
76 According to Tomuschat, the abandonment amounts to a mutual vote of mistrust, 
see C. Tomuschat, 'Inconsistencies - the German Federal Constitutional Court on 
the European Arrest Warrant' (2006) 2(2) European Constitutional Law Review 209, 
225. 
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2. Mistaken Analogy: The AFSJ Is Not the Internal Market 
A common theme in literature has been to seek comparison with the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition in other policy fields, most 
notably the internal market sphere,77 the origin of the principle.78 The simple 
transfer of mutual recognition and the analogy between policy fields as 
alleged by the EU was met with heavy criticism. The two main arguments that 
have appeared are; the 'harmonisation argument' and the 'qualitative 
difference argument'.79 
 
Regarding the first, according to Peers, simply transferring the principle from 
the internal market to criminal matters 'might appear unexceptional', 
'however, on closer examination, those analogies are deeply flawed', 'because 
the Council has made the error of assuming that the underlying law need not 
be comparable'.80 Those 'underlying laws' do indeed need to be 'comparable' 
as 'mutual recognition in the internal market was only successful due to the 
high level of harmonisation that already existed'.81 
 
The second main argument against the simple analogy, the 'qualitative 
difference argument', centres on the fundamental difference between 
criminal law and market integration. When zooming in on requirements or 
presumptions of trust in the operation of mutual recognition, significant 
differences appear. While in the internal market product requirements have 
to be recognised, which indeed can have serious repercussions for consumer 
health and safety, criminal law cooperation has even more serious 
consequences as it involves individuals subjected to disadvantageous or even 
coercive measures of a foreign state, and as such interferes with fundamental 
                                                 
77 For a comparison of mutual recognition in the two policy areas see Janssens (fn 2). 
78 Mutual recognition was 'invented' by the CJEU in the EU internal market context, 
in relation to freedom of goods (product requirements) in Case-120/78, 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:42, Cassis de Dijon and gradually expanded to cover other 
Community policy areas such as the free movement of services, and mutual 
recognition of diplomas. 
79 See also C. Murphy, 'The European Evidence Warrant: Mutual Recognition and 
Mutual (Dis)trust?' in Eckes and Konstadinides (fn 65) 224, 226. 
80 S. Peers, 'Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the EU: Has the Council Got it 
Wrong?' (2004) 41(1) Common Market Law Review 5, 5. 
81 Murphy (fn 79), 226.  
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rights. Therefore, mutually recognizing each other's judicial decisions is more 
demanding than recognizing goods regulations.82 
 
The subject of trust (product requirements vs. human rights) thus differs 
significantly, the logic underlying the notion of trust however (the equivalence 
presumption) is similar. As an illustration to underline the difference, think 
of the different 'trust' required when someone asks you to borrow your pen 
or your brand new car. Whereas the former might not be much of a problem, 
the latter would only occur in more developed relations. By analogy, the same 
can be said for cooperation in criminal justice matters; a specific type of 
relation is at stake. 
 
3. General EU Principle of Mutual Trust 
The principle of mutual trust is not exclusive to the EU's involvement in 
criminal justice matters and has long been regarded relevant for EU law.83 In 
fact, the principle has relevance for interstate relations more widely, and in 
international relations theory mutual trust between states is regarded a 
precondition for stable relations based on expectations about other states' 
behaviour.84 The same can be said for the recognition of foreign criminal 
judgments more broadly.85 
 
In the wider EU context, the principle of mutual trust has a similar meaning 
and is linked to expectations and predictions of how other Member States 
will act. Its weight has steadily increased over the years and 'has been brought 
up with increased frequency … in the European political/legal debate'.86 
                                                 
82 See also S. Lavenex, 'Mutual Recognition and the Monopoly of Force: Limits of the 
Single Market Analogy' (2007) 14(5) Journal of European Public Policy 762. 
83 The principle of mutual trust has been described as being 'at the heart of the 
European Union', Eijsbouts and Reestman (fn 16), 1. 
84 See for example A. Hoffman, 'A Conceptualization of Trust in International 
Relations' (2002) 8(3) European Journal of International Relations 375. 
85 See M. Plachta, 'The Role of Double Criminality in International Cooperation in 
Penal Matters' in N. Jareborg (ed), Double Criminality: Studies in International 
Criminal Law (Iustus Förlag 1989) 84, 118. 
86 P. Cramér, 'Reflections on the Roles of Mutual Trust in EU Law' in M. Dougan and 
S. Currie (eds), 50 Years of the European Treaties: Looking Back and Thinking Forward 
(Hart Publishing 2009) 43, 43. 
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Mutual trust is in its core a mechanism to ensure compliance with EU law, or 
maybe better; to explain compliance. Underlying this notion is either a 
(sufficient) level of comparability of national laws or EU legislation to ensure 
that national laws are comparable. As abstract as the notion of trust itself is 
the question what constitutes a 'sufficient level' of comparability. This differs 
from one policy area to another, and even within a single policy area 
differences appear between various types of measures (recognition of an 
extradition request requires different safeguards than recognising out of state 
evidence). This leads to various notions of trust, in other words, trust 
functions differently in the various EU policy fields.  
 
4. Calls for Further Development of Mutual Trust 
Ever since the EU's involvement in criminal justice matters, it has been hard 
to find academic literature on the topic that does not somehow mention the 
term trust. Literature on the issue of trust has often focused on the absence 
of grounds on which it is supposed to be founded, mainly in the form of 
procedural rights. Normative development of the concept of mutual trust in 
the particular EU criminal justice context has come about more slowly.87 The 
hiatus has not gone unnoticed though and recently concerns have been raised 
and the need for development of the principle has been underlined. Herlin-
Karnell for example, holds that the lack of 'articulation of what mutual trust 
actually means in the field of criminal law' poses 'a significant lacuna in EU 
criminal law cooperation'.88 And Ostropolski, while speaking of the 
importance of a principle of mutual trust, recognises that it 'lacks an explicit 
normative basis'.89 The recognition of this 'lacuna' is certainly a first step 
                                                 
87 For accounts of mutual trust see for example D. Flore, 'La notion de confiance 
mutuelle: l' <alpha> ou l' <omega> d'une justice pénale européenne?' in de Kerchove 
and Weyembergh (fn 9) 17; G. Stessens, 'The Principle of Mutual Confidence 
between Judicial Authorities in the Area of Freedom, Justice and Security' in G. de 
Kerchove and A. Weyembergh (eds), L'espace pénal européen: enjeux et perspectives 
(Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles 2002) 93; V. Mitsilegas, 'Judicial Concepts of 
Trust in Europe's Multi-Level Security Governance' (2015) 3 EUcrim 90; and 
Vermeulen (fn 8). 
88 E. Herlin-Karnell, 'Constitutional Principles in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice' in D. Acosta Arcarazo and C. Murphy (eds), EU Security and Justice Law After 
Lisbon and Stockholm (Hart Publishing 2014) 38, 42. 
89 Ostropolski (fn 33), 166. 
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towards filling it, and calls for such development have become more urgent 
with the increasing use and importance of the term. Fichera has made an 
attempt to define trust in non-legal terms, but at the same time he stressed 
that 'future policies and strategies' should take into account that 'mutual 
trust in European criminal law is not uniformly developed'. 90 A warning that 
has not been given due consideration by EU policy makers.  
In a wider EU context, Cramér 'believe[s] that analysing the functions of 
mutual trust in the European integration process has the potential to be a 
fruitful endeavour that might further our understanding of the development 
and functioning of EU law'.91 This statement seems particularly relevant for 
the EU criminal law context considering the central function of mutual trust 
and the pace of development in the field, and strengthens the proposition 
that the EU's discourse leaves much to be desired and underlines the 
importance of the concept of trust for the further development of the AFSJ.  
 
IV. TRUST AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT 
 
In order to improve our understanding of mutual trust in the specific 
environment of EU criminal justice cooperation, it might be useful to take a 
step back and look at what elements of social trust it actually entails. Mutual 
trust is not a principle of law that can be closely defined, but is in essence a 
social construct.92 The term trust in the EU context is often used in the 
vernacular, as if clear in itself, but as has been demonstrated in the above, it is 
far from. 
 
In its broadest form, trust is typically described as the reliance on another 
person or entity. Trust can be attributed to relationships between people, but 
                                                 
90 M. Fichera, 'Mutual Trust in European Criminal Law' (2009) 10 University of 
Edinburgh Working Paper Series, 19. 
91 Cramér (fn 86), 44, furthermore, he believes 'that further investigation of mutual 
trust between actors within the EU in relation to the functioning of EU law has the 
potential to provide us with insights that may enhance our ability to understand the 
dynamics of EU law and European integration at large', 60. 
92 See also Fichera (fn 90), mutual trust is 'a non-legal term' and 'a sociological approach 
may be helpful to elaborate a concept that can be applied in a legal-political context', 
19. 
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also to relationships within and between social groups and entities. The 
broad relevance of trust is accurately described by Gambetta: 
 
the importance of trust pervades the most diverse situations where 
cooperation is at one and the same time a vital and fragile commodity: from 
marriage to economic development, from buying a second-hand car to 
international affairs, from the minutiae of social life to the continuation of 
life on earth.93  
 
Hence trust is studied in most of the social science disciplines, including 
history, philosophy and political science. It is important to note that there is 
not one overarching definition of trust, but that trust takes upon different 
meanings and forms in the various disciplines. This section will identify four 
core elements (or indicators) of trust literature that can be used to clarify 
what trust entails in the specific EU criminal justice sphere.94 It will be 
demonstrated that trust as it functions in EU criminal justice cooperation 
does not fit tightly with the concept of trust as developed in social science 
literature. Some core elements can be attributed to trust in the area of 
cooperation under examination, while others are harder to locate.  
 
1. Willingness to Take Risks 
The first indicator of trust highlighted here is risk. There is agreement 
amongst scholars that the willingness to take risks, or the idea that trust 'refers 
to an attitude involving a willingness to place the fate of one's interests under 
the control of others', constitutes an important element of trust 
relationships.95 Elster defines this important aspect of trust relationships in 
the following way; 'to trust someone is to lower one's guard, to refrain from 
taking precautions against an interaction partner, even when the other, because 
of opportunism or incompetence, could act in a way that might seem to 
justify precautions'.96 This behavioural definition of trust requires a double 
                                                 
93 D. Gambetta, 'Foreword' in D. Gambetta (ed), Trust: Making and Breaking 
Cooperative Relations (Basil Blackwell 1988).  
94 This is by no means an effort to comprehensively cover trust, but rather an exercise 
to highlight the value of an inter-disciplinary perspective.  
95 Hoffman (fn 84), 376-377. 
96 J. Elster, Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (CUP 
2003), 344.  
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abstention; 'one party's refraining from precautions in the hope that the 
other will refrain from opportunistic behaviour'.97 According to Heimer, 
trust comes into play in situations involving both the vulnerability of one 
party to the other and the uncertainty of the trustee,98 and she regards 
vulnerability and uncertainty as the core elements of a trust relationship. In a 
trust relationship the truster always runs a risk of betrayal,99 if this risk is 
removed from cooperation trust is no longer a problem. 
 
When translated to EU interstate relations, more in particular in the 
framework of the EAW, several precautions have been taken to minimise the 
risk involved. Both in accordance with the EAW's mandate (the grounds for 
refusal listed in the EAW), and contrary to it, such as a general human rights 
refusal ground.100 Therefore, the risk involved when cooperating on the basis 
of the EAW is limited. Member States have prior to embarking on 
cooperation negotiated a document containing specific rules on when a 
request has to be executed, leaving minimal leeway and a relatively high 
degree of certainty. 'Mechanisms that create certainty about a potential 
trustee's future behavior replace the need for trust in relationships,' and 
'make betrayal impossible'.101 Therefore, this important element of a trust 
relationship does not fully appear in EU criminal justice cooperation. 
Member States have not shown full 'willingness to place the fate of one's 
interests under the control of others',102 and actors are, to a large extent, 
barred from opportunistic or incompetent behaviour, minimising the risk 
involved. That is not to say that trust is not involved at all, but that the issue 
of trust is not clear-cut; trust is required for certain acts on which the 
                                                 
97 ibid. 
98 C. Heimer, 'Solving the Problem of Trust', in K. Cook (ed), Trust in Society (Russell 
Sage Foundation 2003) 40. 
99 See for example A. Baier, 'Trust and Antitrust' (1986) 96(2) Ethics 231. 
100 For example the UK, section 21(1) of the Extradition Act 2003, requires the judge 
who is otherwise required to proceed to order the surrender of a wanted person to 
'decide whether the person's extradition would be compatible with the Convention 
rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998'; another example is the 
Netherlands, see art 14 Overleveringswet. 
101 Hoffman (fn 84), 378. 
102 ibid, 376-377. 
237 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol 9 No.1 
cooperating Member State could err, but if the margin for error is completely 
removed, trust is no longer required and has been replaced by certainty.  
2. Interest 
A second important indicator of trust relationships highlighted here is that 
of interest. In a trusting relationship, which at minimum consists of two 
parties, a trustor and a trustee, both parties can be assumed to be 'purposive', 
meaning that they both aim to satisfy their interests.103 An important reason 
to enter into a trusting relationship is to satisfy an interest, or even stronger, 
interests are likely to be 'the whole point' of many relationships.104 There is 
'strong agreement' in trust literature that 'the decision to entrust one's 
interests to others is usually based on the belief that the fulfilment of that 
trust will make the trustor better off'.105 This can be easily felt when we think 
of our own experience with trust relationships; actors will likely choose 
strategies that serve their self-interest.106 
 
This element of a trust relationship is evident in EU (criminal justice) 
cooperation. Member States initially decided to enhance interstate 
cooperation in criminal matters to be better equipped to combat cross-
border crime, a common interest. More specific interests are served by the 
various cooperation instruments such as the EAW (returning fugitives from 
justice), but can be grouped under the general goal of strengthening criminal 
law enforcement and creating a borderless AFSJ. This example does not allow 
for a definitive conclusion as to whether a relation can be labelled 'trust 
relation', but merely serves the purpose of showing an aspect of a trust 
relation.  
 
                                                 
103 J. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press 1990), 96. 
104 See R. Hardin, 'Conceptions and Explanations of Trust', in Cook (fn 98) 3, 8. 
105 Hoffman (fn 84), 382. 
106 Alternatively, there are accounts that hold trust is grounded in a strong moral 
commitment to fulfil certain kinds of trust (the belief that trusting is a good thing in 
its own right). These cases of trust do indeed exist in social life (even though they do 
not characterise the majority of trust relationships), but will be difficult to find in 
inter-state cooperation. For an account that considers morally motivated actions to 
be part of trust, see for example D. Messick and R. Kramer, 'Trust as a Form of 
Shallow Morality', in Cook (fn 98) 89. 
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3. Differentiating Between Trust and Trustworthiness 
A third element, or maybe more accurate distinction that has to be made 
when speaking of trust, is to differentiate between trust and trustworthiness. 
It is a common conceptual slippage not to do so, not only in ordinary language 
use, but also in trust literature.107 Simply put; 'if everyone we interact with 
were trustworthy, there would be no problem of trust'.108 The assessment of 
trustworthiness and the act of 'trusting' someone are two separate steps. The 
use of trust often refers to the entire trusting relationship, both the trusting 
and the trustworthiness.109 Statements as 'trust has to be strengthened', 
'fostered' or 'enhanced' are examples of such slippage. After all, moving 
actors towards trusting if the trustee is not trustworthy can be seen as 
perverse. The most compelling reason for this slippage 'is that trustworthiness 
commonly begets trust.'110 The use of trust and trustworthiness as one 
'combined' concept can be easily explained considering that something that 
causes trustworthiness will possibly lead to trust. The two are not 
distinguished from each other since they are connected. It is however 
necessary to make this distinction considering these are two different aspects 
of a trust relationship. One might be trustworthy, but you might never act 
upon it, but there could equally be cooperation with a non-trustworthy actor, 
especially if the room for choice is narrow or lacking at all. 
 
Much of the concern with trust in the EU criminal law context is actually 
concern over the lack of trustworthiness. The EU is currently asserting to 
'build trust' with for example the Roadmap. But these seem more like 
attempts to increase trustworthiness. It is not necessary that these will lead 
to trust. 
 
There can be many different reasons why someone (this includes groups and 
entities) is perceived as trustworthy. Important in this light is information.111 
                                                 
107 Hardin (fn 104), 16. 
108 K. Cook, 'Trust in Society', in Cook (fn 98), xiv. 
109 Hardin (fn 104), 16. 
110 ibid, 17. 
111 See also Alegre, 'mutual trust must be based on mutual knowledge that such trust is 
reasonable', as it can take away 'the blindfold'. S. Alegre, 'Mutual Trust- Lifting the 
Mask' in de Kerchove and Weyembergh (n9), 41, 43. 
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Expectation is essential in most accounts of trust, meaning that trust follows 
on the expectation that a truster has; 'trust is … inherently a matter of 
knowledge or belief'.112 Of course we often trust or distrust for bad reasons. It 
is important to stress that when speaking of reputation, we essentially speak 
of reputation for trustworthiness, not trust. As said, trusting necessarily 
involves taking risks, and 'actors that fail to accurately assess their 
counterparts' reliability are more likely to have their interests betrayed'.113 
The danger of betrayal can be reduced by improving both the amount and 
quality of information available about cooperation partners. Information is 
key in enhancing trustworthiness.114 In the EU context there currently seems 
insufficient information on the various national legal systems at play in the 
AFSJ in order to make a fair assessment of trustworthiness. 
  
4. Trust Is a Three-Part Relation 
A last aspect highlighted here is that trust is a three-part relation; A trusts B 
to do X.115 Trust relationships are never unconditional; therefore, all three 
parts are necessary. It does not make much sense to simply state that A trusts 
B. In order to clarify the underlying logic of the trust relation and to be 
precise about what we mean we have to always be able to add the 'to do x' part 
to the equation. A might trust B to do X and Y, but not to Q and R. In other 
words, trust is very much contextual. 
 
In contrast, there are theories of trust that suggest trust between parties can 
be general, thus a two-part relation that takes the form 'A trusts B'.116 
However, there are not many relationships in which a truster has 
unconditional trust in the trustee, hence the three-part relation is the 
stronger argument.117 
                                                 
112 Hardin (fn 104), 7. 
113 Hoffman (fn 84), 379. 
114 Of course, the opposite can also be true when this information shows that the other 
party is not worthy of trust; see also Alegre (n111), 45. 
115 Hardin (fn 104), 12-16. 
116 See e.g. R. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community 
(Simon and Schuster 2000). 
117 One possible argument to the contrary could be that the three-part relation of trust 
'makes it seem that the list of issues over which A trusts B is known in advance, but 
in practice this is rarely the case.' However, the 'list' does not have to be known in 
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The addition of the 'X' is particularly important for the type of trust we are 
analysing, since mutual recognition operates in an ad hoc manner, meaning 
that cooperation takes place only in those areas designated by specific 
legislation. Trust is thus only required for these specific acts. Mutual 
recognition does not function in a broad manner, i.e. Member States are not 
required to trust every single aspect of the other legal systems. In order to 
make valid, and more importantly, meaningful statements about trust 
between EU Member States it always has to be specified to what 'action' 
exactly this trust refers. Increased specificity might make it easier to 
comprehend the 'trust problem' and to form policies in accordance, as it 
filters out a lot of unnecessary noise. Therefore, the abstract idea that some 
form of generalised trust is required in order to enhance judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters is not only inaccurate, it also clouds the reality that in 
order to make specific aspects of judicial cooperation work, specific 
supporting measures are required. Such a perspective makes the trust 
building policy more comprehensible and might lead to more concrete goals.  
 
5. Why Are We Even Speaking of Trust? 
The above has shown that what is labelled mutual trust in the EU criminal law 
context is not a clear-cut example of what a trust relationship is according to 
social science literature on the topic. For example, the important element of 
risk (a core part of trust) is minimised by pre-existing legal arrangements. At 
the same time, it is clear that the relations at stake serve a particular interest 
and fulfil this element of trust relations. As such we might consider the trust 
at issue to be a species of the genus social trust, not a stereotypical application 
of the concept of trust, but one with specific characteristics in the EU 
criminal justice context. Hence, trust in this particular context has a meaning 
that differs from everyday notions of trust, and therefore a policy to build or 
enhance trust should answer to its specific needs. Social science literature on 
trust can help in achieving this by showing where trust is at stake, and where 
it is not. In case it is the latter, it should be questioned whether legislative 
instruments to build trust should be employed, as these have far reaching 
consequences for national criminal law, something which should be kept to a 
minimum in line with mutual recognition's rationale. In the current discourse 
                                                 
advance, it can develop over time and the 'X' will present itself when examining an 
ongoing relationship, see Hoffman (fn 84), 378. 
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trust relates to pretty much everything that stands in the way of a successful 
functioning of mutual recognition, in this sense it is a collective term. While 
this is convenient for policy makers and legislators, i.e. the answer to every 
problem is trust (or better a lack thereof), it is not very helpful in furthering 
the establishment of an AFSJ. 
 
V. MUTUAL TRUST, A TERM OF ART 
 
Mutual trust in the EU criminal justice sphere thus has a meaning and 
function specific to its environment, and does not in every possible sense link 
with the social construct that trust is. Therefore, a social science perspective 
only tells part of the story and mutual trust consists of additional elements. 
This section will highlight a number of its core elements, supporting the idea 
that mutual trust is a term of art in the EU criminal justice environment. 
  
1. Fundamental Rights 
The core of mutual trust in the EU criminal law sphere is its link with 
fundamental rights. The meaning attributed to mutual trust in literature 
largely comes down to 'the relationship between the level of harmonisation 
(in sense of "harmony") of procedural law and procedural safeguards on the 
one hand, and the level of mutual trust as a condition for successful mutual 
recognition on the other'.118 Criticism has mostly focused on the (false) 
presumption of trust, by pointing to the widespread and often poor provision 
of defence rights throughout the EU,119 and the absence of a (explicit) 
fundamental rights refusal ground in the EAW. The CJEU has recently for 
the first time allowed to derogate from mutual recognition when 
fundamental rights will be violated.120 If the Court continues this line of 
reasoning there might be more instances in which refusal would be 
permitted. A positive development in light of safeguarding fundamental 
rights in an AFSJ and recognition of the different realities within this area, as, 
argued by Mitsilegas, mutual trust does not only follow on the existence of 
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120 In Aranyosi, see section II.4. 
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fundamental rights, but also vice versa.121 Mutual trust and the safeguarding 
of defence rights throughout the EU could actually be enhanced by 
recognising limits to its presumed existence, contrary to the Court's earlier 
line of cases in which it contended that any limit to the presumption of trust 
would hinder the implementation of mutual recognition. In light of these 
recent developments, the process to mitigate the fundamental rights critique 
seems to have really taken off. But, while fundamental rights might indeed 
form the core of a concept of mutual trust in criminal justice cooperation, the 
concept entails more than just the link with fundamental rights and the quest 
to harmonise these standards.  
 
2. Reciprocity 
Reciprocity is an example of another core aspect of the principle of mutual 
trust. As aptly described by Fichera 'mutual trust can be intended as the 
reciprocal belief that others' behaviour will not violate the basic common 
principles that lay at the heart of the EU legal systems.'122 The idea of 
reciprocity is that while the EU lacks a general mechanism to enforce its 
legislation, Member States more frequently than not comply with EU law.123 
One explanation for this high degree of loyalty with EU law is the expectation 
that all other Member States implement and apply EU law in the same 
efficient manner. Without this expectation, the Union would not function as 
it does today, 'accordingly, all Member States have a self-interest to comply 
in order to safeguard the stability of the system'.124 Yet, the CJEU has held 
that the principle of reciprocity does not have legal status in the Union. In 
Hedley Lomas, the Court ruled that a Member State cannot unilaterally decide 
to relieve itself of its obligations under Union law because another Member 
State has breached its obligation.125 In its decision the Court emphasised the 
                                                 
121 Mitsilegas speaks of a 'symbiotic relationship' and identifies several dimensions to 
the relation mutual trust-fundamental rights, see V. Mitsilegas, 'The Symbiotic 
Relationship Between Mutual Trust and Fundamental Rights in Europe's Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice' (2015) 6(4) New Journal of European Criminal Law 
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122 Fichera (fn 74), 207. 
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need for mutual trust between Member States,126 and by doing so 
distinguished reciprocity from mutual trust. This decision is understandable 
when thinking of the consequences of giving formal status to reciprocity; if 
one Member State for whatever reason errs in its obligations under EU law, 
this would threaten the whole system. That is not to say there is no role for 
reciprocity, it functions more at the level of a state's psyche, namely it has an 
interest in cooperation for the sole reason that other Member States do the 
same, and since they have that same interest this will not easily lead to 
problems. Only the most fundamental concerns might lead Member States 
to disobey and risk jeopardising this harmony or status quo. 
 
Reciprocity underlying compliance is a common mechanism in theories of 
international relations and public international law.127 Whereas the EU 
might have limited enforcement powers, on the international level this is 
even more so as a global government is lacking. Reciprocity is widely accepted 
as a standard of behaviour which can produce cooperation among sovereign 
states.128 Reciprocity is thus an important factor in explaining cooperation 
between sovereign actors based on self-interest. 
 
In the criminal law sphere, more in particular the EAW, reciprocity has no 
formal status, yet it forms an important aspect of mutual trust in this context. 
A concrete example of reciprocity in the EAW context was Spain's reaction 
to Germany's temporary suspension of the EAW pending constitutional 
amendment. Spain, invoking reciprocity, declared that it would no longer 
execute EAW's, and that it would process requests from Germany under the 
'old' pre-EAW legal framework.129 
 
                                                 
126 ibid, para 19. 
127 See e.g. R. Keohane, 'Reciprocity in International Relations' (1986) 40(1) 
International Organization 1. 
128 Or as Zoller puts it, reciprocity 'is a condition theoretically attached to every legal 
norm of international law', E. Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies (Transnational 
Publishers 1984). 
129 See Z. Deen-Racsmány, 'The European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender of 
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The idea that states have a common interest in suppressing international 
(cross-border) crimes is the foundation of why states would engage in 
international cooperation in criminal matters.130 If states want to successfully 
fight crime, especially in a globalising world without borders, cooperation is 
a necessity, and reciprocating other states' assistance and efforts in doing so 
becomes a must. Trust as a mechanism explaining cooperation refers to this 
self-interest and reciprocity. In the end, Member States would not engage in 
a measure such as the EAW if their actions would never be reciprocated, 
when they extradite a suspect under the EAW, they 'trust' that next time 
when they themselves request a person under the scheme, that effort is 
returned. 
 
3. The Loyalty Principle 
The loyalty principle,131 or the principle of sincere cooperation, is a 
fundamental principle of EU law and has been central in shaping the EU's 
legal order. Particularly relevant in the early stages, when obligations were not 
as inclusive as they are nowadays, but the principle has never left the 
institutional stage. Member States show a high degree of loyalty with EU law, 
despite the lack of a general enforcement mechanism. This can partly be 
ascribed to (a degree of) trust and the expectation that other Member States 
will act in a similar manner. As such loyalty is an outcome of trust and 
reciprocity. The principle carries weight particularly in the criminal law 
sphere, as its development has been piecemeal, and enforcement 
opportunities have slowly improved, but are still incomplete.132 Fichera 
regards the principle of loyal cooperation as 'the basis of mutual trust and 
mutual recognition'.133 The link between loyalty and reciprocity is more 
precisely the 'belief that others' behaviour will not violate the basic common 
                                                 
130 This idea dates back to Grotius, see H. Grotius, 'De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Volume 2, 
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principles that lay at the heart of the EU legal systems'.134 So (receiving) 
loyalty has a price, namely acting loyal. This circularity can also be found in 
the concept of trust, in order to be trusted one has to act trustworthy. 
Somewhere in that chain a leap has to be taken in order to overcome the 
initial deficit. In this sense it helps that loyalty (or 'sincere cooperation') has 
the status of a legal principle and Member States are bound to 'assist each 
other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties'. Therefore, when 
Member States are acting 'insincere', i.e. not in accordance with their 
obligations under the Treaties or secondary law, they breach a legal 
obligation. And even though the drafters have chosen to keep the term trust 
out of the formal sphere of the Treaties, the loyalty principle has been 
described as consolidating the concepts of 'trust, solidarity and respect'.135 
The (three) concepts are regarded as inextricably linked, and in order for 
Member States to operate loyally, trust is required. 
 
According to Herlin-Karnell, the 'elasticity of the loyalty principle' is at the 
core of the interpretation of mutual trust.136 It is indeed a question of how 
much loyalty national courts are willing to show, and as evidenced by the case 
law on the EAW there are limits as to this, even without a formal ground to 
review the compatibility of the EAW with human rights. Examples as these 
reveal the parameters within which cooperation on the basis of mutual trust 
operates, and that as much as mutual trust is limited, the principle of loyal 
cooperation is too. 
 
4. The Equivalence Presumption 
An important aspect of trust is (its relation with) the equivalence 
presumption.137 The presumption originates in the internal market 
application of mutual recognition, namely that national regulation may be 
different, but equivalent. In the criminal law sphere, the subject of 
equivalence is different, market regulation can be substituted for procedural 
safeguards in criminal proceedings, but the logic is the same. The equivalence 
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or comparability presumptions are underlying or even equal to the trust 
presumption, and as such lead to a double presumption. In this regard it has 
to be noted that the equivalence presumption in the criminal sphere is more 
absolute than in the internal market and allows for few exceptions.138  
 
The specific degree of equivalence required for smooth cooperation is not 
known from the outset, and even if it would, this will be hard to express or 
measure (possibly in terms of minimum requirements). But given that 
Member States enter into cooperation, at least the general perception is that 
there is sufficient equivalence. More specifically this has to be established in 
practice, i.e. by trial and error. The degree of equivalence required for a 
specific measure will thus be exposed by the process started with the 
negotiation of an instrument to its application in practice. This process is a 
manifestation of the flexible nature of trust; the institutional architecture 
therefore has to allow that its limits are dynamic and subject to negotiation 
and limitation where necessary. This can in turn serve as a mechanism that 
will point out in what specific areas harmonisation, i.e. greater equivalence, is 
required. 
 
One important distinction that has to be made here is that equivalence is 
different from compliance. There will largely be equivalence as to 
fundamental rights standards within the EU (all states are bound by the 
ECHR), however when it comes to compliance with these standards, large 
differences appear. This is linked to the distinction, frequently made in 
literature, between trust in abstracto and trust in concreto.139 The equivalence 
presumption does nothing more than presuming that standards, even though 
different, are equivalent -  a formalistic or in abstracto approach. The question 
whether these are correctly applied in practice is a different one and can be 
described as in concreto. So it can be said that while trust may (be presumed to) 
exist in abstracto, there are signals that trust in concreto is more problematic.140 
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VI. THE HYBRID CHARACTER OF MUTUAL TRUST 
 
In the above, several elements of the principle of mutual trust in the EU 
criminal justice context have been identified. Broadly speaking, these could 
be grouped into 'social' and 'legal-political' elements. When these two groups 
of elements are brought together, a complete, and arguably hybrid image of 
trust appears. On the one hand elements which in social science literature 
have been attributed to a concept of (social) trust, on the other elements 
which are more particular to the surroundings of EU cooperation, or even 
more specifically to EU criminal justice cooperation. It is important to value 
both sides or aspects of mutual trust equally since treating trust as if purely 
legal-political would raise false expectations. The power to control and steer 
trust by means of legislation is only a limited one, and a wide variety of factors 
impact on its existence. The role of trust building legislation is to create the 
conditions for Member States to be trustworthy. But if one thing, trust 
cannot be forced. Therefore, a conclusive presumption as for example in 
Opinion 2/13 is not constructive. The path chosen by the Court in Aranyosi, 
namely to open up the presumption to rebuttal, is more likely to enhance 
trust by stimulating dialogue and in the process improving trustworthiness. 
 
On the legal and political side, mutual trust has emerged as a core principle in 
the development of the field labelled as EU criminal law and is widely 
regarded to be a prerequisite for mutual recognition-based cooperation. It 
had already gained relevance for EU law long before and trust might be the 
very reason why Member States cooperate to begin with. In the context of 
the AFSJ, the principle has a slightly different meaning from its application 
in other EU policy fields, mainly because of the nature of the issues involved, 
namely dealing with criminal law necessarily involves (the violation of) 
fundamental rights. The principle of mutual trust brings together several of 
the foundational principles of the EU's legal order and as such is a collective 
notion. Mutual trust links with reciprocity and loyalty, functions on a level of 
equivalence and, particularly important in the criminal law context, heavily 
relies on respect for fundamental rights and procedural fairness.  
 
But while mutual trust in the AFSJ operates in a legal and political 
environment, it cannot be seen as completely detached from its nature as a 
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social construct. If this were the case, we could just let go of the term trust 
altogether. If we call it trust, it should at least have some links with what trust 
is; a social construct which is to an extent an abstract notion, but that should 
not be an excuse to suspend further efforts to understand its meaning and 
functioning. While the version of trust under consideration here shows 
anomalies vis-a-vis the concept of social trust, as for example the tendency to 
minimise risks in criminal justice cooperation, there are also similarities, such 
as the interest-based nature of the relationship at stake. Hence, keeping a 
close eye on trust as in social science literature can help explain the 
phenomenon under examination and guide future attitudes towards trust. 
Accordingly, a number of adjustments to the EU discourse might be helpful 
and can improve clarity. For example, distinguishing between trust and 
trustworthiness, recognising the importance of information, and adding the 
X when making statements about trust have been suggested in this light. 
 
Important to stress is that this has by no means been an effort to closely 
define trust; this is not only impossible, it would also run counter to the 
dynamic and flexible nature of the principle.141 Nevertheless, increased 
normative clarity is needed to hold to account those who have turned trust 
and trust building into the core of the EU criminal justice policy and are 
legislating in accordance. A conceptual idea of what mutual trust is and what 
it is not, can contribute to a fair and just enhancement of cooperation in penal 
matters among EU Member States, possibly with less emphasis on trust 
building, or at least recognise that this might (often) be political rhetoric 
more than legal reality. 
A trust building policy should keep in mind the essence of mutual 
recognition; cooperation despite differences, and mutual trust's function is 
to enable cooperation on the basis of regulatory differences. The scope of its 
functioning lies within the boundaries of what is acceptable for Member 
States. If the divergence is too great the system of mutual recognition will fall 
apart, but if the divergence is too little, there is no longer a need for trust. 
Focussing on harmonisation in the name of trust building is not only contrary 
                                                 
141 See also Suominen, 'Mutual trust is difficult to quantify. It is a very abstract 
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to the original objective of mutual recognition and the much valued 
sovereignty of national criminal systems, but it is questionable whether 
harmonisation should be regarded as trust building altogether. The more 
harmony the less need there is for trust and vice versa. Hence, if the aim is to 
remove differences, trust evasion might be a more accurate term than trust 
building. In other words, if there were no more differences between national 
systems, trust would no longer be an issue and cooperation would be fully 
automatic. 
 
Instead, an effort should be made to create the conditions that enhance 
trustworthiness while preserving, as much as possible, the identities of 
national criminal justice systems. Since the (ground breaking) EAW a large 
number of mutual recognition instruments have been adopted, with varied 
success. In the process, the critique on the functioning of the AFSJ has only 
increased. In this sense mutual trust is a threat and an opportunity at the same 
time. A continuation of the emphasis on the presumed existence of trust will 
further diminish the desire to cooperate as Member States might not want to 
be pressed to trust and cooperate in sensitive areas of criminal justice.142 
When it is acknowledged that trust cannot be forced upon judicial 
authorities and be steered and controlled by legislation, but that its (slow) 
growth might involve taking some risks and reciprocating trustworthy 
behaviour, the principle of mutual trust might prove valuable in the quest to 
enhance EU criminal justice cooperation. 
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